This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the factors that lead electric utilities to participate in the Department of Energy's voluntary greenhouse gas registry, and the impact of participation on their actual emissions performance. Firms that participate tend to be larger and have higher emissions. Firms are more likely to participate when the cost of participation is lower and when the pressure to participate and the expected value of ERCs are higher. Participating in the 1605b program has no measurable effect on a firm's carbon intensity, i.e., carbon emissions per unit of electricity generated. Firms that participate tend to have increasing emissions but report reductions; non-participants tend to have decreasing emissions. Firms' participation may be a form of greenwash, that is, an attempt to appear more environmentally friendly than is really the case.
Introduction
Corporate America is increasingly cutting its greenhouse gas emissions, despite the lack of any federal mandate to do so. 1 Depending upon one's perspective, these actions can be viewed as meaningful steps to combat global warming, or as mere "greenwash" designed to fool a gullible public into directing its attention toward other issues. 2 There has been little systematic empirical work attempting to test these alternative hypotheses, however. In this paper, we tackle this challenge using detailed data from the industry sector that emits the greatest amount of greenhouse gases: electric utilities.
Our To explore the issue more deeply, we formulate a series of testable hypotheses regarding why firms participate in the 1605b program, and which types of firms are more likely to participate. Perhaps the clearest economic motivation for participation is the chance to obtain "early reduction credits" that would have value if the U.S. were to 1 Various explanations for these moves have been offered, including pre-empting legislative action; preparing for anticipated future legislation; cutting costs; currying favor with "green" consumers, investors and regulators; and jockeying for a seat at the table whenever future legislation finally is drafted. See Hoffman (2005; 2006) . 2 For a formal model of "greenwash," see Lyon and Maxwell (2006) . represent fossil fuel-oriented companies and Exelon Corporation (EXC) nuclear-oriented ones. AEP participates at the project level and most of its projects involve carbon sequestration. SO participates both at the entity and the project level but the sum of the 5 Direct reductions refer to reductions from sources owned by the reporter. Indirect reductions refer to reductions from sources not owned by the reporter but somehow affected by reporter actions. An example of indirect reductions is a decrease in power plant emissions due to a decrease in end-use electricity consumption, which in turn is at least partly attributable to electric utilities' demand side management programs. Sequestration refers to the removal and storage of carbon from the atmosphere in carbon sinks such as trees, plants, or underground reservoirs. See Voluntary reporting of Greenhouse Gases 2003 , EIA (2005 .
project level reduction is the same as the entity level reduction. EXC participates at the project level and its projects include transportation-related ones. For all three companies generation at non-fossil fuel units such as nuclear or hydro accounts for the majority of their generation-related projects.
Testable Hypotheses
This paper draws on and contributes to three areas of research: early reduction credits, public voluntary programs, and greenwash. Early reduction credits refer to giving credits for emissions reductions firms voluntarily undertake prior to the implementation of a mandatory program. The literature on early reduction credits (ERCs) examines the comparative merits and demerits of early reduction credits as a tool for cost-effectively achieving the Kyoto target and discusses issues specifically related to granting credit to the 1605b participants. Under public voluntary programs, participating firms agree to make good faith efforts to meet program goals established by the regulatory agency; in return, they may receive technical assistance and/or favorable publicity from the government. The growing body of literature on public voluntary programs ranges from theoretical evaluations of their welfare implications to empirical examination of firms' participation in various voluntary programs. 6 Greenwash refers to firms' attempt to appear more environmental friendly than is really the case. The emerging literature on greenwash identifies both theoretically and empirically the conditions under which firms are more likely to engage in greenwash.
The idea of granting ERCs for GHG reductions was first suggested in the President Clinton's Climate Change Proposal of October 1997. It was intended to increase political support and make any subsequent mandatory GHG reduction targets easier to achieve by encouraging early reductions. 7 The advantages include a gradual (rather than abrupt) adjustment to a carbon constrained world, reduced risk of hitting 6 See Lyon and Maxwell (2004) . 7 The General Accounting Office's report (1999) examines issues specifically related to granting credit to the 1605b participants and concludes that the 1605b guidelines are too flexible to warrant early reduction credits. Department of Energy, however, still indicated that there is the possibility that early reduction credits are granted to the 1605b participants. GAO/RCED-99-23.
thresholds that trigger climate change, and an increased probability of complying with regulations, e.g. Kyoto Protocol (Michaelowa and Rolfe, 2001 Dirtier firms are more likely to participate, probably because they face greater media scrutiny and pressure from environmental or citizens' groups. 9 The effect of greater external pressure suggests that firms are more likely to participate when they face greater external pressure from environmental groups, communities, state politicians, or industry associations. 10 In particular, Sam and Innes (2005) Evidence on the effect of growth rate on participation is limited. Videras and Alberini (2000) find that the firm-specific growth rate is in general not significant. For the Green Lights and WasteWi$e programs, they do not find any significant effect of firm-level growth rate. For the 33/50 program, they find a significant negative effect, but in only one out of three model specifications. DeCanio and Watkins (1998) examine how the industry-specific growth rate affects the probability of participating in the Green Lights program and find that the effect is positive and significant.
In the case of GHG related programs, another important factor to consider is firms' fuel mix. A hypothesis is that firms that rely heavily on GHG emitting fuels (fossil fuels) are subject to greater pressure to reduce emissions, thus more likely to join voluntary programs. Karamanos (1999) examines this hypothesis for the Climate
Challenge program, using a fraction of electricity generated from fossil fuels. He finds a significant positive effect of fossil fuel use on participation. depend upon the firm's probability of success in its environmental activities, and the probability the firm is informed about the outcome of its activities at the time it makes a disclosure.
They find that punishing greenwash motivates firms with a low probability of success and high probability of being informed to fully disclose. These firms gain a lot from advertising a success and lose little by disclosing a failure since they are already expected to fail. Conversely, firms with high probability of success but low probability of being informed are likely to shift towards non-disclosure. They gain little by disclosing a success and lose a lot by disclosing a failure. For firms with moderate probability of success, partial disclosure is attractive as long as expected punishment is not prohibitively high. For them disclosing a success can bring about significant improvement in public perception, while withholding a failure can prevent significant damage. Thus, they are willing to risk public backlash by disclosing only partially. As expected punishment increases, however, partial disclosure is no longer profitable for any type of firms. Instead, dirtier firms are more likely to fully disclose and cleaner firms not disclose at all.
Ramus and Montiel (2005) empirically examine conditions under which firms are more likely to greenwash. In the context of their paper, firms engage in greenwash when they commit to environmental policies in their public statements but do not implement them. Ramus and Montiel (2005) find evidence that firms are more likely to greenwash when they face institutional pressures to commit but the expected benefit from implementing their commitment is slim. In particular, service firms are more likely to greenwash than are manufacturing firms.
The nascent academic literature on greenwash suggests an additional hypothesis:
firms with moderate levels of environmental performance are the most likely to engage in greenwash. 15 Firms seen as already very clean have little incentive to disclose information, as they already have favorable perceptions from investors; firms seen as very dirty have little incentive not to disclose, as they are already expected to fail. It is firms that are moderately clean that stand to enhance their image by increasing disclosure of their environmental successes. We summarize the hypothesis below: Section 5 discusses the precise variables we use to test these hypotheses.
Econometric Models
We use Probit models to analyze the factors that lead electric utilities to participate in the 1605b program. The theoretical basis for the Probit models is the Run of Domencich and McFadden (1975) . The decision maker has complete information and makes a rational choice based on the information. We the analysts, however, have incomplete information. Therefore, we need to take uncertainty into account. The sources of uncertainty include unobserved alternative attributes, unobserved individual attributes, and measurement errors. To reflect this uncertainty, the firm's utility is modeled as a random variable, which has a deterministic part and a stochastic part. The alternative with the highest utility is chosen. Different assumptions about the random terms lead to different models. We assume a normal distribution, and use a Probit model. In this model, let i denote the firm and j denote the choice to participate in the program (j=1) or not (j=0).
The firm's utility is
We observe
This is equivalent to
Then the probability of participation is
where F is cdf of ε i0t -ε i1t .
If ε i0t and ε i1t are normally distributed with mean 0, so
where Φ is the standard normal cdf.
We assume that firms participate in the 1605b program if the net benefit with participation is greater than the net benefit without participation. Thus, we include the variables that affect the benefit and cost of 1605b participation as regressors in our Probit models.
To estimate the impact of a firm's 1605b participation on our outcome variable of interest, CO 2 emissions intensity (CO 2 emissions per net generation (lbs/MWh)), we use a treatment effects model that takes into account selection on unobservables. 16 The analysis has two stages, 1) participation and 2) outcome. We make a couple of assumptions. Both in the first and second stages, the coefficients of the independent variables are the same for the participants and non-participants. There is no good reason to believe that marginal effects of the regressor variables on carbon intensity are any different between the 1605b participants and the non-participants. They are also exposed to a common unobservable shock. Equation (3) and equation (4) are the second-stage outcome equations for the participants and non-participants, respectively. 17 The approach is fully parametric and the model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The full model is 16 We follow Cameron and Trivedi (2005) . 17 The variables in Z may overlap with those in X, but it is assumed that there exist at least one component of X that is a nontrivial determinant of the participation dummy and not a part of Z, that is, significantly correlated with the endogenous participation variable, but uncorrelated with the outcome variable, except through the participation dummy.
where y 1it and y 2it are CO 2 emissions intensity in the second stage for the 1605b participants and non-participants, respectively. Z it is independent variables that affect CO 2 emissions intensity. D it is a participation dummy and * it D is a latent variable for participation. X it is independent variables that affect firms' participation decision.
We allow for the possibility of correlation between the error terms in the first and the second stage. The nonzero correlation coefficient, ρ, reflects the endogeneity of the participation variable.
Using the participation dummy, the two outcome equations, equation (3) and equation (4) , can be written in one equation.
where
The coefficient of the participation dummy variable in equation (6), η, represents the effect of participation on outcome upon random selection.
The expected difference in outcome conditional on participation, that is, the expected difference in CO 2 emissions intensity between the 1605b participants and nonparticipants, needs to take into account the selection effect. This requires estimating the expected value of µ it conditional on participation, i.e., E(µ it | ε it ≥ -X it δ) and E(µ it | ε it < -X it δ). To estimate this, we assume that µ it and ε it has a joint normal distribution. Under this assumption, the expected values of µ it for the participants and non-participants are represented by:
where f is the standard normal pdf and F is the standard normal cdf. The expected difference in outcome conditional on participation can then be calculated as follows.
Thus, the unconditional and conditional expected differences in CO 2 emissions intensity between the 1605b participants and non-participants can be estimated using equations (6) and (9), respectively. If ρ, the correlation coefficient between µ it and ε it , is significantly different from zero, estimating the conditional expected difference between the 1605b participants and non-participants can provide additional insight into the impact of the 1605b program.
Data
The models are estimated using a pooled database of 83 investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) over the period 1996-2003. 18 The total number of observations in the sample is 596, and thus a firm is in the sample on average for 7 years. The 1605b participation data were collected from the DOE's Voluntary Registry website. 19 Financial, operational and environmental performance-related data were obtained from Platts, a company specializing in energy industry data. 20 Table I provides a list of explanatory variables used in this paper and their definitions. Some of the variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity.
As described in Table I , CO 2 emissions are calculated based on fuel consumption. We take this approach rather than using direct observations from the continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS) for several reasons. First, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) reported that turbulent flow in the stack could bias the CEMS estimates upward by 10-30 percent. 21 Second, NRDC also found cases where the CEMS data deviate from the EIA and FERC estimates when the latter two agreed for the most part. In these cases of discrepancies, NRDC used the FERC-based
estimates. Third, we were able to obtain a more complete dataset using the fuel consumption data than would have been possible using the CEMS data alone. In cases where fuel consumption data were not available, we supplemented our fuel consumptionbased estimates with adjustede CEMS estimates to increase the number of observations.
22 Table I also includes two greenwash-related variables: the absolute difference from the mean and the absolute difference from the median CO 2 emissions for that year.
They are designed to capture Hypothesis 3, that firms most likely to engage in greenwash are those with an intermediate probability of producing positive environmental outcomes.
We approximate this probability with firms' CO 2 emissions levels and measure closeness to an intermediate probability by calculating the distance from the mean or the median level of CO 2 emissions for that year. 19 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/frntvrgg.html 20 Collecting financial and operational data for electric operating companies, especially those of investor-owned, has become very difficult since the mid-1990s when the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical agency of DOE, stopped organizing in a convenient format the raw data that electric operating companies report to FERC. More recently EPA has made publicly available an integrated database, eGRID, which provides emissions and generation data. There are a couple of drawbacks, however. There is a considerable time lag. For example, the database now available covers the period only from 1996 to 2000. Also, there are no financial variables. 21 www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rbr/append.asp. 22 Although we ultimately chose not to use the CEMS data as our primary data source, we did run our estimations using this data as a robustness check. Results were qualitatively similar to what we obtained from the fuel consumption data.
The interaction variable between lag CO 2 emissions and Sierra magazine subscription is constructed based on Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000), who find that toxic reductions over time are greater in states with high emissions levels and strong environmental group membership.
[ Table I about here]
To investigate firms' participation decisions in the 1605b program and their effect on CO 2 emissions intensity, we pool our dataset across years. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, the 1605b program does not require that the IOUs make any shortor long-term commitment. This implies that every year they can opt out or opt in, providing theoretical support for pooling. 23 Second, the Hausman test result demonstrates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. In other words, we do not find any evidence that fixed effects are present. 24 This finding further supports pooled analyses (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 23 This approach is different from how Khanna and Damon (1999) analyzed their data for the 33/50 program. Noticing that once a firm participates, it stays in, they dropped those observations for which oneyear lag participation dummy is 1. 24 We note a couple of qualification in this statement. First, only three firms in our sample show variation in participation status during 1996-2003. Accordingly, fixed effect estimates are based only on these three firms, whereas random effect estimates are based on our full sample. Second, due to convergence problems, we could conduct the Hausman test using a model only with three independent variables deemed most important in making participation decisions (lag CO 2 emissions, electric operating revenue, and Sierra magazine subscription). We obtain χ 2 (2)=2.12 and p-value of 0.346. 25 We assume observations are independent across firms but not independent within firms. For details see Wooldridge (2002) .
House and the Senate. The interaction term between lag CO 2 emissions and Sierra magazine subscription is also more than three times higher for the 1605b participants.
The RPS index, however, is a little higher for the non-participants. The 1605b participants have more low-cost abatement opportunities such as nuclear or hydro availability improvement as opposed to costly new capacity building, proxied by lower capacity factor (higher excess capacity), and higher savings possibilites from switching to natural gas. Heat rate is another measure for low hanging fruit because it measures inefficiency in using fossil fuels, representing heat rate improvement opportunities. Yet, heat rate is about the same for the participants and non-participants. 1605b participation is also associated with greater non-fossil fuel use, proxied by a fraction of hydro and nuclear. Lag 1605b participation trend is the total number of the 1605b participants in the electric power sector in year t-1 and hence similar for both the participants and nonparticipants. This variable represents the idea that a firm takes other firms' actions into account when making a participation decision. Three-year growth rates are on average higher for the participants, although one-year and two-year growth rates are lower. The greenwash variables are higher for the participants.
[ Table II The results are shown in Table III . Models differ in terms of which greenwash variable is included: the absolute difference from the mean or the median CO 2 emissions and the interaction between lag CO 2 emissions and Sierra magazine subscription.
[ Table III about here]
The estimated coefficients of the participation probit equation generally conform to our a priori expectations. We find that firms are more likely to participate if they emit a lot of CO 2 , face greater NGO pressure, have greater revenue, have lower capacity factor, and have greater lagged generation growth (t-3). This is consistent with our hypotheses that firms that are big, dirty, growing, or under pressure are more likely to participate in the 1605b program. We also find support for the hypothesis that firms with low-cost abatement opportunities are more likely to participate. A consistently significant and negative effect of capacity factor on participation supports this hypothesis. Lower capacity factor means greater excess capacity, which implies that a firm can expand its effective capacity with a relatively low expenditure to improve efficiency of operating practices. The negative sign thus indicates that a low-cost abatement opportunity increases the participation rate, holding everything else constant. Firms with inefficient older coal-burning plants that could benefit from a retrofit (proxied by a high heat rate) also have low-cost opportunities. However, we do not find evidence that specifically carbon-related low cost opportunities increase the likelihood of participation in the 1605b
program. This may be because the effect of heat rate-related opportunities on participation dies down once we account for differences in capacity factor. Similarly, we do not find evidence that firms with high-cost oil-burning plants that could be displaced by cheaper, cleaner, and gas-fired generating units are more likely to participate in the 1605b program.
Contrary to expectations, we find that firms that do not face a strong RPS in their state have a higher probability of joining the 1605b program. One possible explanation is that an RPS may drive firms to substitute inefficient for efficient GHG reduction approaches. 27 For example, firms may forgo relatively cheaper heat rate improvement or nuclear uprate opportunities to build a new renewable capacity just to meet the RPS.
Although this is highly plausible, it is still a little puzzling why an RPS decreases participation likelihood because IOUs do report the kinds of projects associated with increases in low or zero emitting capacity. It might be that firms do not report renewable projects until they have actual impact on GHG reductions. The finding might also indicate that for electric utilities state RPS is the main form of external threat and firms participate in the 1605b program hoping to preempt RPS. We also do not find evidence that state-level political factors, represented by LCV scores, have significant effects on 1605b participation.
Regarding the greenwash hypothesis, we find that firms are more likely to participate if their CO 2 emissions are closer to the mean or median CO 2 emissions. Both greenwash variables are significant at the 5% level across alternative model specifications, implying that we cannot reject the greenwash hypothesis. 28 Our findings that both dirty firms and firms with middling environmental records are more likely to participate in the 1605b program may be similar to those of Eesley and Lenox (2005). They examine NGOs' firm targeting behavior and find that both firms' absolute emissions and firms' relative emissions within-industry significantly affect passive NGO's firm targeting behavior. 27 Parmer and Burtraw (2005) find that RPS substitutes for gas. 28 The results are robust to the inclusion of the square of the lag CO 2 emissions variable. [ Table IV about here]
Treatment Effects
In Table IV , we see that firms are more likely to participate in the 1605b program if they have low capacity factor, have high revenue and have growth in net generation (t-3), which is consistent with what we find in the stand-alone participation probit models.
As we would expect, we also find that firms with higher capacity factor and higher fraction of power from hydro or nuclear have lower CO 2 emissions intensity. High capacity factor means low excess capacity. Firms with low excess capacity are assumed to have already taken advantage of relatively low-cost abatement opportunities available to them, i.e., expanding effective capacity through improvement in operating efficiency.
This leads to lower carbon intensity than otherwise. It is not surprising that a higher fraction of non-fossil fuel sources such as hydro and nuclear, which emit zero carbon, lowers firm-level CO 2 emissions intensity. Regarding the impact of 1605b participation on firms' actual emissions performance, we find that 1605b participation has a positive but insignificant effect on CO 2 emissions intensity. 29 Next, we explore the role of indirect reductions and sequestration. The CO 2 emissions and the CO 2 emissions intensity variables as used in the participation probit and the treatment effect models are based on the fuel consumption data and hence do not reflect the indirect reductions and sequestration reported to the 1605b program. We are particularly interested in finding out whether the opportunity to report indirect reductions and sequestration provides firms with added or possibly different incentives to participate in the 1605b program than the case of reporting direct reductions alone. This question arises because, as described in section 1, firms are required to file their operational and financial performance to FERC including their fossil fuel consumption. This fossil fuel consumption data, which is publicly available, indirectly reveals firms' direct CO 2 emissions. 30 Thus, if only direct reductions are reported and the public is fully informed, then it is hard to see why firms bother to report; since 1) truthful reporting will provide only redundant information and 2) greenwash will not fool anyone due to the presence of true information. Of course, this statement holds only when the benefit of retrieving the publicly available data and inferring CO 2 emissions exceeds the accompanying cost for interested parties, whoever they might be. If indirect reductions and sequestration are also allowed to be reported, however, regardless of the relative benefit and cost, firms do have an incentive to participate in the program. They can take advantage of the opportunity to report indirect reductions and sequestration that may not be otherwise publicized.
Examining the role of indirect reductions and sequestration also allows us to examine whether 1605b participation does indeed make a difference in CO 2 emissions intensity, if all types of reductions reported to the program, including direct and indirect reductions and sequestration, are taken into account.
We examine the impact of indirect reductions and sequestration by rerunning the same participation probit and the treatment effect models with two new variables:
adjusted CO 2 emissions and adjusted CO 2 emissions intensity. The adjusted CO 2 emissions variable is created by subtracting the sum of indirect reductions and program, if we do not control for selection on unobservables. Yet, the chi-square test statistic shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that ρ is not significantly different from zero. This in turn tells us that the degree of overestimation due to selection on unobservables, if any, is insignificant. 30 Fossil fuel consumption broken down by fuel types reveals CO 2 emissions level because there is no commercialized end-of-pipe CO 2 removal technology yet.
sequestration as reported to the 1605b program from the fuel consumption-based CO 2 emissions estimates. The adjusted CO 2 emissions intensity variable is obtained by dividing the adjusted CO 2 emissions by net generation. Table V and Table VI show the regression results for the probit and treatment effect models, respectively. They are virtually identical to those reported in Table III and   Table IV in terms of the significance of the coefficients and their signs. This suggests that the opportunity to report indirect and sequestration projects did not provide much in the way of added or different incentives to participate in the program. In addition, with the adjusted CO 2 emissions and intensity variables, 1605b participation has a negative effect on CO 2 emissions intensity in two out of three model specifications, but its effect is still not significant.
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[ Table V about here]
[ Table VI about here]
Conclusion
We have presented the first empirical analysis of the factors that lead electric utilities to participate in the Department of Energy's voluntary greenhouse gas registry, and the impact of participation on their actual emissions performance.
We find that firms that participate tend to be large (both in terms of revenues and carbon dioxide emissions), have low capacity factors, face growing demand, and be in states with large numbers of environmental group members per capita. These results suggest that firms are more likely to participate when the cost of participation is lower, and when the pressure to participate is higher.
State-level political factors appear to play little role in participation; in particular, neither House nor Senate attitudes on environmental issues had measurable effects on participation. Surprisingly, firms are less likely to participate if they are in states with 31 We also examined whether 1605b participation had any measurable effect on reductions in CO 2 emissions intensity over the period 1995-2003. We did not find any significant effect of 1605b participation. More than half of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution projects relate to non-fossil fuel units, such as increases in solar and wind power capacity and availability, and efficiency improvement at nuclear and hydro units. For example, the nuclear projects improve availability by decreasing the length of refueling outages and reducing forced outage rates by enabling certain maintenance activities, which used to be performed only during outages, to be performed with the unit online. The hydro projects improve efficiency and extend the life of aging equipment through facility improvement.
A few projects report activities related to coal-fired units: improving heatrate via nonroutine activities such as operational changes, equipment replacement and load optimization, and adding gas capability to previously coal-fired units.
The energy end use projects encourage efficient energy use by providing incentives for homeowners, commercial and industrial customers to adopt more efficient equipment and to use lighting more efficiently. Of AEP's projects, 77% involve carbon sequestration, most of which is accomplished by afforestation and reforestation through tree planting. The halogenated substance project involves sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 ) gas reduction. SF 6 is a GHG that has about 22,000 times higher global warming potential per About half of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution projects are similar to those reported by AEP, but SO also reported seven "other" projects. They include nuclear capacity uprating, natural gas-based combustion turbine and combined cycle units, biomass and switchgrass projects. Nuclear capacity uprating refers to increasing the maximum power level at which nuclear power units operate, which requires NRC approval. Nuclear capacity uprating is equivalent to increasing low carbon emitting capacity. The increases in natural gas fired units (new combustion turbine and combined cycle units) represent CO 2 reductions compared to coal-fired generation. SO was also investigating the feasibility and profitability of co-firing biomass and switchgrass with coal. Two of its subsidiaries, Georgia Power and Mississippi Power, have co-fired biomass with coal. Cofiring with switchgrass is still at an experimental stage.
The cogeneration and waste heat recovery projects report the use of natural gas at cogeneration plants, that is, plants that produce both electricity and steam. CO 2 reduction is achieved in two ways. One is by using a low emitting fuel source, natural gas, instead of coal. The other is by utilizing heat that would otherwise have been discarded. Had the same amount of heat been generated separately, CO 2 about oil and natural gas systems and coal mining, and 4 about carbon sequestration.
EXC also reported one "other" emission reduction project.
All of the electricity generation, transmission and distribution projects are about non-fossil fuel units. Eleven projects reported nuclear uprating, 9 reported wind and solar energy-related efforts, 5 reported hydro facility overhauls, and 1 reported improvement in distribution efficiency. Wind and solar energy related projects cover a wide range of applications from installing new facilities to raising public awareness of alternative energy resources and renewable energy markets. EXC overhauled seven hydro units to improve unit efficiency and overall plant capacity.
The cogeneration and waste heat recovery project reported fuel switching from coal to natural gas and installing heat exchange equipment. In addition to typical efficiency improvement projects, the energy end-use projects include a load control program which provides incentives for large commercial and industrial customers to cut electric loads upon request during peak periods. Transportation and off-road vehicle projects report how widely EXC invests in alternative fuel vehicles and uses them in its facilities. The waste treatment and disposal projects are about using landfill gas to generate energy; this reduces emissions of methane, which has 23 times higher global warming potential than CO 2 (EIA, 2004). The project on oil and natural gas systems and coal mining reports improvement of the natural gas distribution system. Carbon sequestration was mostly done by tree planting but also by recycling some wood utility poles. Each pole reused represents a tree that was not cut down to manufacture a new utility pole. The "other" emission reduction project reported recycling of materials including paper and metals, which can reduce GHG emissions by displacing the production of these products from alternative sources, which may require more energy intensive production processes. Revenue from sales of electricity (10 9 $).
Heatrate (inefficiency)
A ratio of heat input to net energy generated (Btu/kWh).
Capacity factor (excess capacity) A ratio of energy generated to maximum that could have been generated. It is calculated by dividing net generation (MWh) by (nameplate capacity (MW)×8760(hours)).
Fraction of hydro and nuclear (fossil fuel independence)
A ratio of energy generated from hydro and nuclear units to total energy generated.
LCV scores (state-level pressure)
The League of Conservation Voters (LCV)'s scorecards for Senate and House.
RPS index (State-level regulation)
State Renewable Portfolio Standard index. It is calculated by dividing % goal by the difference between the goal year and the enacted or effective year, whichever comes first.
*** Lagged fuel switch saving (low cost abatement opportunity)
Lagged (t-1) low cost and low carbon fuel switching opportunity (10 6 $). For each electric operating company fuel switch saving is estimated based on the data of the month with the highest generation for the year. It is calculated by multiplying the amount of oil-based generation with the difference in fuel costs between oil and natural gas if oil-based and natural gas-based are juxtaposed when ordered from low cost to high cost generation and the cost of natural gas is lower. Lagged SO 2 emissions (general environmental performance) Lagged (t-1) sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions (10 9 lbs).
Lagged 1605b participation trend (taking other firms' actions into account)
Lagged (t-1) total number of 1605b participants in the electric power sector **** Growth in generation (t-1, t-2, and t-3) (firm growth)
Percentage growth compared to base year (t-1, t-2, and t-3).
Absolute difference from mean or median lagged CO 2 emissions (greenwash tendency) This is calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between the mean or median lagged CO 2 emissions for the year and lagged CO 2 emissions (10 9 lbs) Interaction between lagged CO 2 emissions and Sierra Subscription (greenwash tendency) This is obtained by multiplying the values for lagged CO 2 emissions (10 9 lbs) and Sierra Subscription (thousands). 2 is a chi-square test of the assumption that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% (all two-tailed tests). 2 is a chi-square test of the assumption that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. ρ is the correlation coefficient between the error terms of the first-stage participation and the second-stage outcome equations. χ 2 [1] , ρ=0 tests the independence of the two equations. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% (all two-tailed tests). [17] 76.70 {0} 80.14 {0} The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 1605b participation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Degrees of freedom are in square brackets. P values are in curly brackets. χ 2 is a chi-square test of the assumption that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% (all two-tailed tests). 2 is a chi-square test of the assumption that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. ρ is the correlation coefficient between the error terms of the first-stage participation and the second-stage outcome equations. χ 2 [1] , ρ=0 tests the independence of the two equations. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% (all two-tailed tests). 1.00E+08
1.50E+08 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 Year (base year=1995) Reductions (Tons CO2 eq.) non-participants participants
